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Honor values articulate gender roles, the importance of reputation in maintaining one’s
place in society, and maintaining respect for the groups one belongs to. In that sense
honor provides a template for organizing social interactions and hence may be functional
even among people and societies that do not report valuing and endorsing honor.
We test the prediction that honor influences judgment and attention when activated
in two experiments (N = 538). Using a culture-as-situated cognition perspective, we
predicted that activating one aspect of honor would activate other aspects, even among
individuals who do not much endorse honor values. We tested these predictions among
European Americans, a group that is not typically associated with honor values. In each
study, participants were randomly assigned to experimental or control groups, which
differed in one way: the experimental group read statements about honor values as
a first step and the control group did not. Participants then judged stick-figure pairs
(judging which is male; Study 1, n = 130) or made lexical decisions (judging whether a
letter-string formed a correctly spelled word; Study 2, n = 408). In Study 1, experimental
group participants were more likely to choose the visually agentic figure as male. In
Study 2, experimental group participants were more accurate at noticing that the letter-
string formed a word if the word was an honor-relevant word (e.g., noble), but they
did not differ from the control group if the word was irrelevant to honor (e.g., happy).
Participants in both studies were just above the neutral point in their endorsement of
honor values. Individual differences in honor values endorsement did not moderate the
effects of activating an honor mindset. Though honor is often described as if it is located
in space, we did not find clear effects of where our letter strings were located on the
computer screen. Our findings suggest a new way to consider how honor functions,
even in societies in which honor is not a highly endorsed value.
Keywords: culture, situated cognition, lexical-decision, embodiment, gender
INTRODUCTION
Dueling, being a knight, and honor killings are each specific instances of honor behaviors that
are specific to societies, times and places. Though different, each of these specific behaviors
has a common intent—clarifying roles and exhibiting integrity to protect reputation and rank
in a social unit. These elements of honor are quite consistent across time (historical analyses,
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Nisbett and Cohen, 1996; contemporary analyses, Rodriguez
Mosquera et al., 2002a; Cross et al., 2013). In the current paper
we take up an implication of this consistency, which is that
individual and group-based marking of role, rank, and position
within a social order may be rooted in functionally universal
cultural themes of sustaining groups and relationships. Using this
lens, honor behaviors highlight the need to invest in the group,
to behave in ways that others in one’s in-group can rely on, and
to preserve the group’s relative advantage. We propose honor to
be part of a universally available knowledge network, or cultural
mindset, that can be made accessible by subtle environmental
cues. Cultural mindsets are knowledge networks that serve as
meaning-making frameworks and influence what is attended to
and which goals and mental procedures are salient (Oyserman,
2015, 2017).
Considering honor as a functionally universal cultural mindset
implies that it is broadly available for use, rather than being used
only in some societies, as previously assumed. Honor can be
considered an element of moral reasoning (e.g., a binding value,
see Graham et al., 2013). However, prior work has highlighted
differences in how much social honor is valued and endorsed as
compared to how much the dignity of each person within the
group is valued and endorsed. Taking action to avenge slights
and restore reputation is experienced as necessary by some
people and in some societies more than others, the difference
being whether third parties can be expected to intervene or
if people and groups are obligated to act on their own. In
‘honor’ societies, what others’ think matters and vigilant attention
to the possibility of losing face or losing respect is necessary
(Stewart, 1994; Cohen et al., 1996; Margalit, 1996; Rodriguez
Mosquera et al., 2002a; Gregg, 2007). In ‘dignity’ societies,
others are de-emphasized and what matters is one’s own norms,
values, and beliefs (Leung and Cohen, 2011; Cross et al., 2013).
The implication typically drawn from these kinds of contrasts
is that honor and dignity societies are quite different. Indeed
the idea of societal difference is underscored by the fact that
‘honor’ and ‘dignity’ societies are located in different parts of the
world – the Middle East, Mediterranean regions, Latin America,
and Southern United States vs. Northern Europe and Northern
United States.
Yet, this between-society difference does not necessarily imply
that honor responses are only comprehensible in honor societies.
Instead, it is possible that honor is a cultural mindset, an
organized structure in memory, containing relevant content,
procedures, and goals, even if it is not chronically activated.
Whether an honor mindset is chronically activated or not
and how much honor values are endorsed are interesting
issues to be sure. However, neither of these interesting issues
rules out the possibility that honor mindsets can be activated
with resultant shift in judgment and attention toward honor
relevant content, goals, and procedures even if honor is neither
chronically activated nor particularly endorsed. In the current
paper we test this cultural mindset activation prediction in two
experiments with Northern American participants. In the next
two sections we outline what honor is and then we use culture-
as-situated cognition theory to explain what we mean by honor
mindsets.
The Concept of Honor
Honor is a multi-faceted and multi-level construct that includes
the self (individual level), the family or other social unit (group
level), and gender roles and norms (e.g., female chastity, male
agency) as detailed next. Honor involves individual and group-
based reputation for integrity, honesty, being true to one’s
principles and marking place by earning respect, not tolerating
disrespect and insults, and protecting oneself and one’s family,
group or clan from face loss and reputational harm (e.g.,
Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a,b; Gregg, 2005, 2007; Cross
et al., 2013; Uskul et al., 2013; Novin et al., 2015). Beyond that,
honor requires different things of men and women. Female honor
involves shame, chastity, and purity (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera
et al., 2002a,b). Honorable women may gaze down as a sign of
modesty (Vandello and Cohen, 2003). In contrast, male honor
involves potency, including strength, power, and agentic action.
Male honor is based on toughness, strength, and power to
protect oneself, one’s property, and one’s family from insults and
threats (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996; Vandello and Cohen, 2003).
Honorable men stand up straight as a sign of confidence (e.g.,
IJzerman and Cohen, 2011).
Honor is also described as if it were an object, located in space.
In English, honor is described as if it were ‘up’ on a vertical
axis and on the ‘right’ on a horizontal axes. Thus, people can be
worthy of high honors, uphold their honor, have a high sense of
honor, can lose honor and sink down to being the lowest of the
low so people will look down on them (see also Richardson et al.,
2001 for the verticality of the word respect). Honorable deeds can
be described as having done the right thing, restoring a situation
to an honorable plan can be described as putting matters to right,
and a person who is a trusted confidant can be described as being
one’s right hand man.
The empirical honor literature contrasts ‘high-honor’ groups –
Turks, Middle Easterners, Spaniards, Latin Americans, or
Americans from the Southern United States with ‘dignity’
groups – Northern Europeans, or Americans from the North
(e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a,b;
Uskul et al., 2015).
Some between-group differences are dependent on
experiencing threats to honor, with differences between
‘high-honor’ and ‘low-honor’ groups muted or absent when
threats to honor are absent (Cohen and Nisbett, 1994; Beersma
et al., 2003; IJzerman et al., 2007). Compared to samples from
‘dignity’ groups, samples from ‘high-honor’ groups perceive
more conflict, feel more negative emotions, and act more
defensively and aggressively (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; IJzerman
et al., 2007; Vandello et al., 2008; Barnes et al., 2012). One study
showed a difference between high and low-honor groups in
their response to shame, with ‘high-honor’ groups responding
(e.g., via verbal disapproval) to protect their social image and
‘low-honor’ groups by simply withdrawing (Rodriguez Mosquera
et al., 2008).
Other between-group differences are not dependent on
experiencing threat. Individuals from high-honor societies are
more involved in risk-taking (Barnes et al., 2012) and self-
harm (Osterman and Brown, 2011), are more likely to engage in
school-violence (Brown et al., 2009), and are less likely to seek
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mental health care (Brown et al., 2014). At the individual level,
endorsement of honor values is associated with honor-relevant
behavioral and emotional responses – for example defensive
responses to personal or national threats (e.g., Barnes et al.,
2014), especially among individuals from high-honor groups
(e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b; Uskul et al., 2015).
Taken together, evidence to date highlights the following:
honor involves individual and group-based social reputation and
ranking, specified masculine and feminine gender roles, and is
often described as if it was physically located in space. Though
typically studied as between group comparisons, we propose that
these attributes may be functionally universal. Indeed, people
describe honor as self-esteem, being respected by others, and
moral behavior in both Northern American and Turkish groups
(Cross et al., 2014). Some honor effects are found only if threat to
honor occurs, others seem context-sensitive. In the next section,
we build on these valuable findings, asking if honor might be
considered a cultural mindset rather than being more part of
some culture than others. To explain what we mean by a cultural
mindset, we turn to the culture-as-situated cognition theory.
Culture-as-Situated-Cognition
Culture-as-situated cognition theory has three core premises
(Oyserman, 2015, 2017). The first premise is that human
cognition is situated (Fiske, 1992) and contextualized (Schwarz,
2007; Smith and Semin, 2007). People do not act on all
their available knowledge, but instead on that subset of their
knowledge that is contextually activated and feels relevant at
the moment of judgment. The second premise is that human
culture developed from the survival necessity of connecting with
others (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). The third premise is that
culture is both a functional universal, found across societies, and
a particular set of practices that together form a ‘good enough’
solution to the basic problems each society faces – sustaining
the group over time, organizing relationships, and facilitating
individual welfare (Schwartz, 1992; Cohen, 2001). Addressing
these basic problems requires sensitivity to others’ perspectives
and self-regulation so that one can connect, cooperate, and fit in,
and motivation to initiate and invest in problem solving so that
creative solutions can be generated (Oyserman, 2011, 2017).
From this social core, basic cultural mindsets develop that
influence the meaning people make of their experiences. Cultural
mindsets should function like other associative networks, the
features of which are well known (e.g., Meier et al., 2012). For
example, within associative networks, speed and accuracy of
recognition are a function of prior experience with the same
or related objects or words. Prior experience serves as a prime.
When a previously encountered word or object is recognized, this
is termed perceptual priming (e.g., Neely, 1991; Levy et al., 2004).
When recognition is based on prior encounter with an associated
word or object, rather than with the one currently presented, this
is termed conceptual priming. That is, what was primed was a
construct to which the word or object was related, rather than
the word or object itself (e.g., Schacter and Buckner, 1998; Levy
et al., 2004). Frequent or recent activation of a construct increases
the likelihood that it will be used, influencing the accuracy and
speed with which related constructs are recognized (e.g., Strack
and Deutsch, 2004). What constitutes ‘related’ is a function of
co-occurrence. If cultural mindsets function as other associative
networks do, then encountering words and objects relevant to the
mindset should increase accessibility of related words and objects.
The two most commonly studied cultural mindsets are
individualistic and collectivistic mindsets. Both individualism
and collectivism are related to the basic problems of survival.
Individualism highlights individual welfare and reinforces
innovation; collectivism emphasizes group boundaries
and structuring relationships. Some societies emphasize
individualism and some collectivism. Indeed, a large body of
research demonstrates cross-societal variation in the chronic
activation of these mindsets and in the specific practices
associated with them (for reviews, Oyserman et al., 2002;
Oyserman and Lee, 2008; Oyserman, 2011). At the same time,
individualism and collectivism are both part of human culture
and research shows that both individualistic and collectivistic
mindsets are easily activated across different modern (meta-
analysis Oyserman and Lee, 2008) and traditional societies (for
examples Cronk, 2007; Cronk and Leech, 2012). Once activated,
individualistic and collectivistic mindsets influence how
ambiguous situations are perceived by influencing accessibility
of an associative network of constructs (Oyserman, 2017).
We suggest that honor, though less studied, is also related
to the basic problems of survival in the following ways. Honor
highlights the need to invest in the group, the need to behave
in ways that others in one’s in-group can rely on, and the
need to preserve the group’s relative advantage. If honor is
a cultural mindset, then people should have an available,
though not necessarily activated, knowledge network of honor-
related content, procedures, and goals. Just as individualistic
and collectivistic cultural mindsets can be activated, it should
be possible to activate an honor mindset with subtle contextual
cues (Oyserman, 2011, 2017). Once activated, an honor mindset
should serve as a meaning-making framework which influences
affect, behavior, and cognition, including judgment and attention.
Much in the way that stereotype threat effects are not dependent
on endorsing stereotypes (Steele and Aronson, 1995), the
influences of an honor mindset should be separate from how
much honor values are endorsed. We looked to the literature
for evidence that honor mindsets can be activated, finding a
study that looked at effects on truth telling (Leung and Cohen,
2011) and a study that looked at effects on honor values
(IJzerman and Cohen, 2011). As detailed next, these studies
focused on honor values rather than on an activated honor
mindset per se.
In the truth telling study, Leung and Cohen (2011) had
participants watch video clips depicting violent retaliation to
insult and assessed truth telling in an ostensibly unrelated
task. Lying was lower in Latinos and white Southerners who
agreed with what they saw in the videos compared to those
who disagreed. The extent of agreement with the video had no
effect on truth telling for non-Southerners. The implication is
that watching violent retaliation to insult cues honor only if
this particular aspect of honor is valued. In the honor values
study, honor values were successfully cued in non-Southerners
assigned to posture (upright not slouched) and word stem (honor
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not neutral) conditions before filling out an honor values scale
(IJzerman and Cohen, 2011). While showing an effect on honor
values, for a number of reasons this study cannot address our
prediction that an activated honor mindset increases use of honor
to make sense of the world. First, the dependent variable was
endorsement of honor values, but we predict an effect separate
from value endorsement. Second, effects required an embodied
element, but whether embodiment is always needed is unclear.
Third, IJzerman and Cohen do not specify whether the honor-
relevant words in the word stem task (independent variable)
were also in the honor scale (dependent variable). It is possible
that effects are at least in part accounted for by the perceptual
fluency of the repeated words. Repeated words would be easier
to recognize and prior work shows that experienced ease can
carry over to judgments of liking and truth (Schwarz et al.,
2007).
As an example of the problem in interpreting IJzerman and
Cohen’s study, participants in their experimental condition might
have encountered the stem ho___ and filled in honor. Having
seen the word honor before might make honor more perceptually
fluent when encountered again on the values scale, resulting in
higher endorsement of statements containing the fluent word if
fluency is interpreted as truth. It is not clear that IJzerman and
Cohen were interested in the distinction between perceptual and
conceptual fluency but given our set of predictions, the underlying
process matters. It is possible that subtle cues (i.e., completing
an honor value scale) increase perceptual fluency (seeing a word
once makes it easier to see it or agree with it when it is seen
again soon after). However, to document that honor is a cultural
mindset, we need to show that an activated honor mindset has
effects that are due to conceptual fluency and not only due to
perceptual fluency.
The Current Studies
In two studies we tested the prediction that honor is a
cultural mindset, a meaning-making lens that has downstream
consequences for judgment and attention. We did so by testing
differences in the judgments and perception of participants who
either did or did not fill out an honor values scale prior to
making judgment or reporting their perceptions. We predicted
that an activated honor mindset would increase use of honor-
relevant information in processing information for subsequent
judgment and attention tasks, independently from how much
honor values were explicitly endorsed. To test our prediction,
we created an honor values scale based on Rodriguez Mosquera
and colleagues’ (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a,b; Vandello
and Cohen, 2003) commonly used honor values scale, which
includes both individual-level and group-level statements. In the
experimental condition participants read and responded to the
honor values scale prior to the presentation of the dependent
variable. We chose this method of activating a cultural mindset
because it allowed us to rule out the alternative prediction,
which is that effects would only be found for participants
who endorsed honor cultural values (see Oyserman et al., 1998
for an example using individualism and collectivism values to
activate these cultural mindsets). We created an honor values
scale that omitted statements about gender norms and that
included some honor relevant words but not others. These
precautions allowed us to have a cultural mindset activation
manipulation that was distinct from our dependent variables.
This was necessary so that we could test our prediction of
conceptual priming. Otherwise, it would have been possible that
our effects were due to perceptual priming, as we argued might
be the case for IJzerman and Cohen (2011). In Study 1 our
method allowed us to test our prediction that honor mindsets
include gender roles even though gender roles were not part
of the activation task. In Study 2 our method allowed us to
test our prediction that honor mindsets have both perceptual
and conceptual consequences since some letter strings involved
words relevant to honor that participants had not read in the
mindset activation task. We used a longer version of the scale in
Study 1 and a shorter version – a subset of the Study 1 scale, in
Study 2.
Our dependent variable in Study 1 was a judgment task –
judging which of two ambiguous figures was ‘male.’ In each
pair, we used a different visual cue of potency taken from the
gender literature. Male dominance and potency are associated
with height and eye gaze (Campbell, 1996; Marsh et al., 2009).
Similarly, larger mass (Ralls, 1976; Fallon and Rozin, 1985) and
higher color contrast (e.g., Hogg, 1969; Prudica et al., 2007)
are experienced as potent, dominant, and male, separate from
whether this is factually true in the natural world. Therefore, we
used these visual potency cues (color contrast, height, gaze, and
body mass) by presenting pairs of figures that differed in each of
these cues presented alone, and asking participants which figure
was male.
Our dependent variable in Study 2 was also a judgment task –
judging whether a string of letters presented on the screen was
a correctly spelled word in English or not. Some of the words
were irrelevant to honor, others were relevant to honor, and
of these latter words, some were in the activation task and
others were new. This allowed us to rule out a number of
alternative possibilities. First, that effects might be found only
among people who endorse honor values. Second, that effects
might not be specific to honor –perhaps activating honor mindset
increases motivation overall. Third, that effects might be only at
the perceptual level –recognition of just previously seen words,
but not at the conceptual level –recognition of new words that
are conceptually associated with but not the same as previously
presented words.
Finally, given linguistic evidence that honor is spatially
represented, in Study 2 we added spatial location (top, to the right
vs. bottom, to the left) to our design. Our goal was to examine the
possibility that spatial location has a main or interactive effect –
improving performance directly or in conjunction with activated
honor mindset.
STUDY 1
Sample
Undergraduates [N = 130; Mage = 19.16, SD = 1.22; 44% male;
94.6% not from border South or Deep South as defined by Cohen
and Nisbett (1994); 56.2% European American, 24.6% Asian
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American, 5.4% American other heritage, 4.6% International,
3.1% Hispanic American, 3.1% Arab American, 3.1% African
American] fulfilled subject pool requirements by participating.
Sample size was determined by our subject pool allocation.
Allocation is set each semester by considering how many
researchers ask for research participants and how many students
sign up for research participation credit. Data were collected
until subject pool enrollment was over. The study obtained
IRB approval and participants granted their written informed
consent.
Procedure
Participants were seated in front of a computer terminal;
instructions and randomization were automatized. Participants
read and rated how much they agreed or disagreed (1 = strongly
disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 5.01, SD = 0.58) with the 18
statements shown in Table 1. In the honor mindset activated
condition (n = 66), the statements were about honor (e.g., “I
prefer to live with honor, even if it means I will earn less money”).
In the no cultural mindset activated condition (n = 64), the
statements were not relevant to honor mindset (e.g., “I think
breakfast is an important meal”). Next came the dependent
variable, a visual task based on the task described by Semin
and Palma (2014). The instructions “An artist wants to decide
which of two figures to use to represent the male character
in a story, click on your choice for the male character in
each pair presented1,” preceded four pairs of ambiguous figures
(Figure 1). In each pair visual potency differed so that one
figure’s color contrast is sharper, one is taller, one has direct
gaze, one has larger body mass than the other. We randomized
figure position (right, left) and the order in which the pairs were
presented.
Analyses Plan
Each participant judged four pairs of figures, choosing which
figure should be used to represent the male figure each
time. Therefore, we used repeated measures logistic regression.
Condition (activated honor mindset, no activated mindset),
potency feature (height, color sharpness, gaze, and body mass),
and participant gender were our independent variables. To test
for possible group-level differences, we divided participants into
those from groups previously identified in the literature as ‘honor’
groups and those previously identified in the literature as not
from ‘honor’ groups. We did so by separating white, not from
the Deep South participants, from all other participants (e.g.,
white participants from the Deep South, Hispanic, Asian, African
American). For simplicity we label this as variable ‘region.’
Both region (Cohen and Nisbett, 1994; Stewart et al., 2006;
IJzerman and Cohen, 2011; Leung and Cohen, 2011) and gender
(Cihangir, 2013) have been associated with honor values in
the literature. Therefore, we tested whether region or gender
influenced judgment in our sample. Region did not influence
judgment (p’s ≥ 0.280), but gender did –men were more likely
to judge the taller figure as male (pheight = 0.047) and the sharper
1Participants were not told what the other figure would be, so they might have
concluded that the other figure was female or less male or had neither gender.
TABLE 1 | Study 1: Honor Values Scale and Filler Questionnaire Items.
Honor Values Scale (Used in Activated Honor Mindset Condition)
I prefer to live with honor, even if it means I will earn less money
To maintain my honor, I should not allow myself to be humiliated by others
Even if I lose social status if I still have my honor, I can respect myself
I would not disregard my honor even under tough life circumstances
My honor will likely be negatively affected if I do not attend to my family
obligations
I would jeopardize the honor of my family if I behaved disgracefully
It is my duty to defend the honor of my family
It is important for me to keep face in front of others
I would lose face if others saw me misbehave
If I am embarrassed, I must not let it show or I will lose face
“My word is my bond” is how I feel; it would be dishonorable to behave
otherwise
Honorable people do not cheat people who trust them
Loyalty is a core part of having honor
Acting right is necessary to maintain my honor
Reputation matters and should be vigorously defended
My honor depends to a high degree on the appreciation and respect of others
Disrespect damages honor
I would show I had no honor if I didn’t care “what others would say”
Filler Questionnaire (Used in No Activated Mindset Condition)
I think breakfast in an important meal
I like to eat a hot meal on a cold day
Eating a balanced diet should be easy to do
The saying “early to bed, early to rise, makes a person healthy, wealthy, and
wise” is a good way to live my life
“Haste makes waste” makes no sense in consumer society
The saying “ the early bird catches the worm” is reminder for me not to
procrastinate
I like the fall season
Ice sparkling on tree branches brightens up even dark winter days
I’m outside a lot during the spring
Traffic can make me angry
I am in a better mood on sunny days
When packages are late I can get annoyed
I prefer well-organized classes
I dislike classes with lot of long readings
The college years should be pleasant
I can imagine taking up cooking as a hobby in the future
I like to read for pleasure
I enjoy working out
7-point response scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). Honor values
scale (α = 0.77, M = 5.01, SD = 0.58). The filler questions were meant to be of
similar valence (M = 5.35, SD = 0.38) but not a scale (α = 0.46).
color contrast figure as male (pcontrast = 0.027). So gender, not
region, was included in the final analyses presented next.
Results and Discussion
As predicted, activated honor mindset influenced judgment,
as reflected in a main effect of mindset condition, Wald
X2(1) = 6.41, p = 0.011, w = 0.22. This main effect is depicted
graphically in Figure 2. Participants in the activated honor
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FIGURE 1 | Study 1: Figure pairs used. Participants were asked to decide which one of the two figures in each pair represented the male character. In each pair,
we have labeled the potency attribute – color contrast, height, gaze, and mass. This label was not presented to participants in the study itself.
FIGURE 2 | Study 1: The effect of activating honor mindset on use of
visual cues of potency to decide whether an ambiguous figure is male.
The activated honor mindset condition rated statements about honor prior to
the visual task. The no activated mindset condition rated statements not
about honor prior to the visual task. Error bars represent standard errors.
mindset condition (M = 81.53%, SE = 2.26%) were more likely
to choose the more visually potent figure as male than were
participants in the no activated mindset condition (M = 73.87%,
SE = 2.28%). We also found a main effect of the specific
visual potency feature used, Wald X2(3) = 103.22, p < 0.001,
w = 0.89. Some of the specific visual potency features we used
were more associated with maleness than others. However, honor
mindset condition and potency feature did not interact, Wald
X2(3) = 2.39, p = 0.495. This means that participants in the
activated honor mindset condition were more likely to choose the
more visually potent figure as the ‘male’ in each case, not just for
some.
To test the prediction that the effect of an activated honor
mindset was not a function of how much honor values were
endorsed, we added the mean honor endorsement score to the
regression equation. Since only participants in the activated
honor mindset condition filled out the honor scale, only these
participants were included in this analysis. As predicted, how
much honor values were endorsed did not influence use of
potency features, Wald X2(1)= 0.11, p= 0.740.
Study 1 results support our prediction that an activated honor
mindset influences judgment separate from endorsing honor
values in a sample of participants whose endorsement of honor
values was moderate, just above the neutral point. Two strengths
of Study 1 are first, the judgment task was subtle and so was
unlikely to have demand characteristics and second, the honor
scale omitted mention of gender so effects are unlikely to be due
to the effect of being explicitly reminded of gender roles. Two
limitations of Study 1, addressed in Study 2, are first, honor values
were not assessed in the no activated cultural mindset group and
second, we showed an effect of activated honor mindset on one
aspect of honor – masculinity, but did not test whether activated
honor mindset affected other aspects of honor. Therefore, in
Study 2 we included a measure of honor values in the no
mindset activated condition and an assessment of processing
fluency – accuracy of recognizing honor words that were not
included in the priming task, using words that cross the spectrum
of individual, group, masculine and feminine components of
honor.
STUDY 2
Sample
Undergraduates (N = 437; Mage = 18.84, SD = 1.68; 38%
male; 91.5% right-handed) participated in a ‘word study’
as part of subject pool.2 Most (68.3%) were European
American (14.5% Asian American, 5.7% African American, 5.5%
2We used a larger sample size than Study 1 because we added the spatial location
factor and effect size was not clear. Sample size each semester was limited by our
allocation in University of Michigan’s subject pool. The study was run in two
sets (one in fall semester, one in winter semester). We requested a prescreening
question to parallel Cohen and Nisbett (1994) and obtain the state participants had
grown up if they grew up in the U.S., obtaining IRB approval for this. However,
the question was erroneously omitted from the prescreening process leaving us
without this information at the individual level. So we obtained university-level
distributions, finding that less than 5% of undergraduates at the University of
Michigan (4.8%) come from border South or Deep South as defined by Cohen and
Nisbett (1994). It is unlikely that our effects were driven by this small subgroup.
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TABLE 2 | Study 2: Honor Scale Item and Lexical Decision Task Letter Strings.
Honor Scale Items Lexical Decision Task
Honor-irrelevant
words
Honor-relevant
words
Non-words
(1) My honor depends on the
appreciation and the respect that
others hold toward me.
(2) To maintain my honor I should
be loyal to my family, no matter
what the circumstances are.
(3) It is my duty to always defend
the honor of my family.
(4) To maintain my honor, I should
always be prepared to defend my
reputation.
(5) To maintain my honor, I must not
allow myself to be humiliated by
others
Casual,
Efficiency,
Happy,
Humor,
Logical,
Methodical,
Miracle,
Presents,
Sympathetic,
Talent
Defend,
Honor, Noble,
Prestige,
Principles,
Protect,
Recognition,
Reputation,
Respect,
Virtue
Accoptance,
Actave,
Acknuwledge,
Autside,
Emosational,
Fergive, Fluwer,
Inderstand,
Laght, Leugh,
Momories,
Optomistic,
Pasitive
Prafit, Smole,
Sniggle, Spirt,
Twolight,
Usoful, Woalthy
Honor Scale M = 4.79, SD = 1.01, range 1.60 to 7.00, α = 0.73. Bolded words are the words that appeared in both the honor scale and in the lexical decision task.
International, 3.2% Hispanic American, 1.4% Arab American,
1.4% American other heritage). The study obtained IRB approval
and participants granted their written informed consent.
Procedure
Participants were seated in front of a computer terminal;
instructions and randomization were automatized. Participants
rated how much they agreed (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly
agree; M = 4.79, SD = 1.01) with five individual-level
and group-level honor statements derived from the scale
in Study 1 (Table 2; e.g., “My honor depends on the
appreciation and the respect that others hold toward me”).
They completed the honor scale either before (activated honor
mindset condition) or after (no mindset activated condition)
completing a lexical decision task. Handedness3, demographics,
and understanding of instructions were obtained before thanking
and debriefing participants. Participants (n = 29) who reported
not understanding instructions were dropped from analyses,
though key results do not change if they are included (see
Supplementary Materials for Summary Tables for results); they
did not differ from other participants in their demographics.4
In the lexical decision task, participants saw a fixation point
(+) presented in the middle of the screen for 200 ms followed
by a letter-string. Their task was to report as quickly as they
could without making a mistake if the string formed a correctly
spelled word in English. To do so, participants were told to
position their index fingers on the M key, labeled “word” and
the V key, labeled “non-word.” The letter-string remained on
the screen until the participant responded. All letter-strings were
pronounceable in English. Twenty letter-strings did not form
3Handedness influences mental representations of spatial location (Casasanto,
2009).
4Mage = 18.86, SD = 1.71; 38.5% male; 68.9% European American, 14.7% Asian
American; 5.1% African American, 5.1% International students, 3.2% Hispanic
American, 1.5% Arab American, 1.5% American other heritage; 91.7% right-
handed.
a correctly spelled word and 20 did and each letter-string was
presented twice in randomized order for a total of 80 trials. Letter-
strings were either above or below the fixation point (vertical
axis) or to the right or left of the fixation point (horizontal
axis). Participants were randomized to vertical or horizontal
presentation. We manipulated whether the letter-strings forming
honor words were located in positions that matched (up, right)
or mismatched (down, left) the linguistic usage of honor. The
statements and letters-strings are all shown in Table 2.
Of the 20 correctly spelled words, 10 were honor-relevant
words (e.g., virtue) from our review of the honor literature that
also came up in our pilot test (N = 101) in which participants
were asked what comes to mind when thinking about honor. The
other ten words had nothing to do with honor (e.g., talent), but
were rated equally positively by a separate sample of students in
a second pilot study (N = 37) using a 10-point scale (honor-
relevant words M = 7.43, SD = 1.86, honor-irrelevant words
M = 7.18, SD= 1.11, p= 0.104).
As can be seen in Table 2, six of the ten honor-relevant
words were new, not presented in the honor values scale
and four were old, presented in the honor values scale. We
operationalized conceptual fluency as accuracy in recognizing
the six not previously seen letter-strings as words and perceptual
fluency as in recognizing the four previously seen letter-strings
as words. We predicted that an activated honor mindset would
increase both conceptual and perceptual fluency regardless how
much honor values were endorsed.
Analyses Plan
In the analyses below, we tested the hypothesized influence
of accessible honor mindset on attention as operationalized as
follows. First, we tested the effect of accessible honor mindset
on response accuracy and latency in recognizing honor-relevant
words in contrast to honor-irrelevant words. Second, we
tested the effect of accessible honor mindset on accuracy and
latency when spatial location matched (up, right) rather than
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mismatched (down, left) the linguistic usage of honor. Third, we
tested the effect of accessible honor mindset as both a form of
conceptual and a form of perceptual fluency. Fourth, we tested
the effect of accessible honor mindset separate from level of honor
values endorsement.
In order to test the first two operationalizations of the
hypothesized influence of accessible honor mindset we used
ANOVA’s with accuracy and latency as dependent variables
and with Mindset Condition (activated honor mindset, no
activated mindset), Word Type (honor-relevant words, honor-
irrelevant words), Spatial Axis (up–down, left–right), and Match
or Mismatch of Spatial Location to Honor (match, mismatch)
as independent variables. There were two control variables.
One control variable was accuracy in recognizing non-words
because this controls both for general attention and for reading
fluency. The other control variable was handedness given that
the literature on response time indicates the influence of
handedness (Casasanto, 2009), indeed, we found that right-
handed participants faster than left-handed participants. As in
Study 1 we tested for the possibility that participant gender
and region influenced responses given that both have been
associated with honor. Since neither participant demographic
was associated with response, neither was included in the
analyses.
To test the third operationalization of the hypothesized
influence of accessible honor mindset we repeated the ANOVA
analyses, but now Word Type consisted of honor-relevant words
used in the scale (perceptual fluency), honor-relevant words
not used in the scale (conceptual fluency), and honor-irrelevant
words. To test the fourth and final operationalization of the
hypothesized influence of accessible honor mindset we used
regressions in order to add endorsement of honor values as a
variable.
Assuming a speed-accuracy tradeoff, to improve accuracy,
speed may need to be sacrificed and conversely, to improve
speed, accuracy may need to be sacrificed (Dickman and Meyer,
1988). Given that instructions were to work as fast as one could
without making mistakes, we expected an effect on accuracy
(our primary dependent variable). The results of these analyses
are presented below. For interested readers, effects on speed to
accurate response are presented in the Supplementary Materials.
Results and Discussion
Participants followed instructions and made few mistaken
identifications of non-words as words or of words as non-words.
These mistaken identification occurred in less than 10% of all
responses (M = 7.4%, SD= 7.8%) and did not vary by condition,
t(406)= 0.62, p= 0.534.
First, we contrasted honor-relevant and honor-irrelevant
words (Supplementary Table S1 for full analysis) and found
the predicted effect of activated honor mindset, as reflected
in a significant two-way Word Type by Mindset condition
interaction, F(1,397) = 11.62, p = 0.001, d = 0.34. Participants
in the activated honor mindset condition were more accurate
in recognizing letter-strings that formed honor-relevant words
as words (M = 95.9%, SE = 0.5%) than participants in the
no activated mindset condition (M = 93.7%, SE = 0.5%),
F(1,403) = 9.09, p = 0.003, d = 0.30). Mindset condition
did not influence accuracy in recognizing honor-irrelevant
words, F(1,403) = 0.48, p = 0.489, d = 0.07, ruling out the
possibility that filling out the honor scale increased motivation
generally.
Second, we contrasted already seen honor words, new honor
words, and irrelevant to honor words (Table 3). As depicted
graphically in Figure 3, the effect of activated honor mindset
on recognizing honor-relevant words was found, regardless of
whether participants had seen the words in the honor scale,
F(1,403) = 7.03, p = 0.008, d = 0.26, or the words were
new, F(1,403) = 5.87, p = 0.016, d = 0.24. These effects
were not moderated by how much participants endorsed honor
(ps> 0.339). As predicted, results indicate that an activated honor
mindset facilitates accurate recognition of honor-relevant words,
separate from endorsement of honor values.
Finally, we examined the effect of spatial location-honor
concept match or mismatch. We conducted two analyses.
First we contrasted honor-relevant and honor-irrelevant words
(Supplementary Table S1) and then we contrasted already seen
honor words, new honor words, and irrelevant to honor words
(Table 3). Effects in both analyses were similar and did not
fit the predicted effect of spatial location-honor concept match.
Rather than the expected facilitation effect of honor words
being spatially located to the top and right, analyses yielded
complex and not easily interpretable location effects. Specifically,
we found a two-way interaction of Word Type and Spatial
Match (Table 3). Post hoc analyses revealed that participants
were more accurate in recognizing honor-irrelevant words in the
mismatch (down, left) than in the match (up, right) location,
F(1,403) = 23.74, p < 0.001, d = 0.49. Accuracy at recognizing
honor-relevant words did not differ as a function of location (seen
before, p = 0.439; not seen before, p = 0.536, honor words).
Endorsement of honor values did not moderate these effects
(ps > 0.651). As Table 3 details, we also found a Word Type
by Spatial Axis interaction and a Spatial Match by Spatial Axis
interaction, as well as a Mindset Condition by Spatial Match
by Spatial Axis interaction. Follow-up analyses, however (see
Supplementary Figure S1) did not provide interpretable insights,
implying that activated honor mindset, as operationalized here,
was not linked to spatial location in any clear way. Supplementary
Materials (Supplementary Tables S2 and S3; Supplementary
Figures S2 and S3) also provide analyses of speed to response,
which show a similarly complex relationship to spatial match
location.
Study 2 results support our predictions that honor is a cultural
mindset that influences attention when activated, separately from
how much honor is valued among participants who are not
particularly high in honor value endorsement (scores were just
above the neutral point). Compared to participants in the control
condition, those in the honor mindset activation condition were
more accurate in recognizing not only honor words they had seen
before, but also new words relevant to the construct of honor that
they had not seen before. Effects were specific to honor words;
accuracy in recognizing other words did not differ between the
groups. Effects were not moderated by how much participants
endorsed honor words.
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TABLE 3 | Study 2: Effect of Activated Mindset, Word Type, Spatial Axis and Spatial Match with Honor on Accuracy of Identifying Letter-Strings as Words
for Honor Relevant Words (Presented in Scale and not Presented in Scale) and Honor Irrelevant Words.
df F d p
Main effects
Word Type 2 14.06 0.53 < 0.001
Mindset Condition 1 5.38 0.23 0.021
Spatial Axis 1 29.79 0.55 < 0.001
Spatial Match 1 11.04 0.33 0.001
Interaction effects
Mindset Condition × Spatial Match 1 0.61 0.08 0.434
Mindset Condition × Spatial Axis 1 2.46 0.16 0.117
Word Type × Mindset Condition 2 6.01 0.35 0.003
Spatial Match × Spatial Axis 1 12.82 0.36 < 0.001
Word Type × Spatial Match 2 3.63 0.27 0.027
Word Type × Spatial Axis 2 15.14 0.55 < 0.001
Mindset Condition × Spatial Match × Spatial Axis 1 9.92 0.32 0.002
Word Type × Mindset Condition × Spatial Match 2 1.30 0.16 0.275
Word Type × Mindset Condition × Spatial Axis 2 1.06 0.15 0.346
Word Type × Spatial Match × Spatial Axis 2 1.14 0.15 0.321
Word Type × Mindset Condition × Spatial Match × Spatial Axis 2 0.46 0.10 0.633
Controls
Handedness 1 15.77 0.40 < 0.001
Mean Accuracy Non-Words 1 461.80 2.16 < 0.001
Error 397
Mindset Condition 1 = Activated Before, −1 = Not Activated, Assessed After lexical decision task; Spatial Match: 1 = Match to Honor Location (top or right),
−1 = Mismatch to Honor Location (bottom or left); Spatial Axis: 1 = Vertical (above, below fixation point) −1 = Horizontal (right, left fixation point); Handedness:
1 = left-handed, −1 = right-handed = −1.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Honor values articulate gender roles, the importance of
reputation in maintaining one’s place in society, and maintaining
respect for the groups one belongs to. In that sense, honor
provides a template for organizing social interactions and
hence may be functional even among people and societies
that do not highly value and endorse honor. Culture-as-
situated cognition theory predicts that contextual cues can
activate honor mindsets, which include a network of associated
constructs and ideas (e.g., male agency) and are used as a
meaning-making lens even by individuals who do not much
endorse honor values. We tested and found support for these
predictions in two studies. In Study 1 experimental group
participants were more likely to choose the visually agentic
figure as male. In Study 2, experimental group participants
were more accurate at noticing that the letter-string formed
a word if the word was an honor relevant word (e.g.,
noble), but did not differ from the control group if the
letter string formed a word that was irrelevant to honor
(e.g., happy). In both studies participants’ mean valuation of
honor was just above the neutral point and differences in
their endorsement of honor values did not moderate the effect
of activating an honor mindset. We also explored, but did
not find, clear support for an effect of spatial location on
accessibility of honor constructs. Our results have implications
for research on honor and situated cognition, which we outline
next.
Implications
Honor research typically focuses on how much honor values
are endorsed, honor-related attitudes, and behavior (e.g., Cohen
et al., 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008) and on associations
between endorsing honor-related values, attitudes, and behavior
(e.g., Uskul et al., 2015). While studying endorsement of honor
values is important, this focus on honor values does not test the
effect of activating an honor mindset separate from endorsement
of honor values. If our prediction is correct, then honor mindsets
are knowledge structures, which influence judgment and
attention when activated, separate from endorsement of honor
values. Supporting our prediction, our results reveal an effect
of activated honor mindset on judgment and attention, separate
from endorsement of honor values. To our knowledge, these
studies are the first to support the possibility that honor mindsets,
like individualistic and collectivistic mindsets, are cultural
mindsets, available in memory, whether or not chronically
activated and whether or not honor values are endorsed. As such,
honor is a plausible candidate as a functionally universal element
of culture. From a culture-as-situated-cognition perspective, the
universality of honor is likely given that honor involves a set
of practices for regulating relationship (e.g., protecting), a core
characteristic of what culture is. However, future studies need to
test the functional universality of honor by examining whether an
honor mindset can be activated in many different cultural groups.
Our results have everyday implications to the extent that
honor mindsets are cued in everyday life. This does seem to be
the case. For example, during the 2016 Republican Presidential
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FIGURE 3 | Study 2: The effect of activating an honor mindset on percentage of letter-strings accurately recognized as words for honor-relevant
words. Already seen = words present in the honor scale, new = words not present in the honor scale, irrelevant = honor-irrelevant words. Error bars represent
standard errors. Analyses include handedness and accuracy at recognizing non-words as controls.
Primary, one of the candidates engaged in critical comments
about the physical appearance of another candidate’s spouse while
at the same time hotly denying that his own hands were small or
that the size of his hands somehow indicated that his penis size
should be questioned. These comments only make sense in the
context of honor mindset being cued with the implication that
failing to preserve one’s spouse from criticism and attacks on one’s
own physical endowment must be responded to.
Our results also have implications for situated cognition
research. We show effects of construct activation separate from
construct endorsement. The other area of situated cognition
in which the separate effects of construct activation and
endorsement have been studied is the domain of stereotyping
(Wheeler and Petty, 2001). Researchers have documented that
stereotypes that are ‘in the air,’ by which is meant that when
they are culturally available for use, they influence judgment,
perception, and behavior, even among participants who do not
endorse the stereotype (Steele and Aronson, 1995). This is true
for everyone; whether or not they are members of the stereotyped
group. It only matters if the stereotypes activated – made
accessible for use in the moment (Wheeler and Petty, 2001). We
show the same effect for honor, implying that honor is a construct
that is available for use, even if not endorsed.
Limitations and Directions for Future
Research
Of course no set of studies is without limitations nor can
it can rule out all alternative explanations and a number of
limitations and alternative explanations to our findings should be
considered. First, in Study 1 we tested effects for cues of maleness,
not femaleness. Second, in Study 2 we tested effects for honor as
up and not for dishonor is down. Third, in both studies we used
lab settings and participants in the U.S. who were mostly non-
Southern European Americans. Fourth, in both studies we used
an “active” control group in which control participants read and
rated filler items rather than a “no-prime” control. We address
each of these issues next.
First, in Study 1 we found that activating an honor mindset
increased use of visual potency as a cue of maleness. We did not
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test for the effect of honor mindset on use of visual information as
cues of femaleness. While not undermining our current finding,
it is possible that activating an honor mindset also influences
perception of femaleness. Consider purity and chastity as an
element of an honor representation of femaleness, Schnall (2014)
argues that a basic metaphor for purity and chastity is a vessel.
This implies that an activated honor mindset should also increase
use of vessels and closed-containers as cues of femaleness. For
example, when an honor mindset is activated, people may be
more likely to judge cups as more female than plates, or chests
of drawers as more female than tables. This possibility fits our
current results and warrants testing in future research.
Second, prior research has shown that positivity is associated
with the vertical axis – positive is up (e.g., Meier and Robinson,
2004). Hence, a possible alternative explanation for our findings
in Study 2 is that our results are due to the positivity of our
honor words. This seems an unlikely alternative explanation of
our results for two reasons: first, we chose honor-relevant and
honor-irrelevant words that had been rated as equally positive
in our pretest, and second, our honor priming effects were
shown only for honor-relevant and not for honor-irrelevant
words. However, it does imply an important next step for future
research. Future research could include both (positive) honor
words and (negative) dishonor words to test for effects in both
directions. Including positive and negative words would allow
us to test if the reason for the current weak effects of location
is because honor is located both at the top (honor) and at
the bottom (dishonor) of the vertical axis (see also Xie and
Zhang, 2014). Including positive and negative words in a within
subjects design would allow a more subtle test of spatial location
effects because people are more sensitive to change than to fixed
position.
Together, both our studies focused on the effect of an honor
mindset on specific indices of cognition: attention and judgment.
This can be considered as an initial step into the examination of
the consequences of an honor mindset on cognition beyond the
existing work on honor in relation to behavioral and emotional
responses to an honor-threatening situation. Future studies are
needed to systematically examine the causal processes of an
honor mindset on cognitive procedures (how people think) and
mental content (what people think), as well as on affect and
behavior.
Third, our studies are lab-based and use mostly non-Southern
European American participants. Using a laboratory procedure
allowed us to show effects on use of visual cues and to
isolate conceptual effects of an activated honor mindset and to
document that our understanding of location cues is currently
limited. This came at the cost of ecological validity. Future
research should seek out ways to test the consequences of
an activated honor mindset in more ecologically valid ways.
For example, future research could look at available materials
such as media representations to see if honor cues are used
to market products that do not seem to be related to honor.
The more honor cues are used for marketing, the more likely
it is that honor will be chronically cued separate from whether
honor is actually valued. For example, does an activated honor
mindset increase willingness to pay for products that fit male
potency and female purity? Furthermore, our effects are shown in
non-Southern white participants. Although this is an important
first step because this is a group in which effects are not expected,
cross-cultural replications are needed to test the theory that
honor is indeed a universal cultural mindset. Moreover, given
that honor values are more salient in some cultural groups (e.g.,
Turkish people), it would be theoretically worthwhile to examine
whether the endorsement of honor values influences judgment
and attention in these typical honor groups.
Fourth, our studies used an active control group in which
control participants read and rated filler statements rather than
a no-prime control group. Having an active control means that
both groups had first read and considered their perspective on the
same number of statements prior to engaging in the dependent
variable task. However, this means that we cannot know what
might be a natural state of affairs. No-prime control groups might
be able to tell us about that but at the same time, would be
non-parallel to the primed group because they had something
on the mind prior to the dependent variable task and that
itself might have created as dissimilarity. Future research could
consider various other ways of creating either control groups or
alternatively of contrasting honor and other cultural mindsets
(individualistic and collectivistic) to further clarify effects.
Taken together, our studies suggest a new way of considering
honor, as a cultural mindset, rather than as a between-group
or individual difference variable. Using this formulation allowed
us to document effects of an activated cultural mindset on
perception separate from endorsement of honor values. It allowed
us to show that effects of honor mindsets are dependent on them
coming to mind. Future research is needed to understand when
honor is likely to be experienced as relevant when it is activated.
ETHICS STATEMENT
Study 1: Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional
Review Board (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor) IRB
EXEMPTION STATUS: The IRB HSBS has reviewed the
study referenced above and determined that, as currently
described, it is exempt from ongoing IRB review, per the
following federal exemption category: EXEMPTION #2 of the
45 CFR 46.101.(b): Research involving the use of educational
tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey
procedures, interview procedures or observation of public
behavior. Consent (computerized): You are being asked to
participate voluntarily and anonymously for half an hour’s subject
pool credit. You will be presented with a questionnaire and a
perception task. The study should take less than half an hour
but you will receive the full half hour credit. You can stop your
participation at any time, without giving a reason. By clicking the
arrow below you provide your consent to participate in the study.
Debriefing form (computerized): Thank you for participating
in our study. You were asked to complete a questionnaire and
to identify which of two stick figures was male. Everyone did
the stick figure task, but some people completed an honor
questionnaire first and some a bogus questionnaire. We want
to examine if completing an honor questionnaire first will
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influence how people judge which stick figure is male. For more
information about research in this area you can go to these
references (IJzerman and Cohen, 2011; Leung and Cohen, 2011).
Study 2: Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional
Review Board (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor) IRB
EXEMPTION STATUS: The IRB HSBS has reviewed the study
referenced above and determined that, as currently described, it
is exempt from ongoing IRB review, per the following federal
exemption category: EXEMPTION #2 of the 45 CFR 46.101.(b):
Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive,
diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview
procedures or observation of public behavior. Consent form
(computerized): You are being asked to participate voluntarily
and anonymously for half an hour’s subject pool credit in the
Word study. You will see strings of letters and as quickly as
possible say if you are seeing a word or a non-word (nonsense
letters). The study should take less than half an hour but you will
receive the full half hour credit. You can stop your participation
at any time, without giving a reason. By clicking the arrow
below you provide your consent to participate in the study.
Debriefing form (computerized): Thank you for participating
in our study. You were asked to identify whether each string
of letters represented a word or a non-word and to fill out a
questionnaire. Some people did the word task first and filled out
the questionnaire first. We want to examine if words that are
related to honor are quicker recognized if they are presented in
a specific spatial place (left, right, up, down). The questionnaire
focused on honor values in daily life, which might influence
reaction time. For more information about this research in this
area, you can go to these references (Schubert, 2005; Schubert and
Semin, 2010). Thank you very much for participating!
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